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STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
Accuracy-Related Penalties; ABA Opinion 85-352
J. Timothy Philipps
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School of Law
OVERVIEW OF GOVERNING STANDARDS
A conglomeration of standards governs the tax lawyer in advising tax return
positions.
II. These include statutory standards established by the Internal Revenue Code
itself through the imposition of penalties on taxpayers and on tax return
preparers.
A. In these cases the lawyer's duties are imposed directly on the lawyer or
indirectly through assessment of penalties on the client.
B. The principal penalties the lawyer needs to be concerned with are:
1. the accuracy-related penalties imposed directly on the taxpayer.
IRC §6661; and
2'. the preparer penalties imposed on the lawyer who prepares a tax
return or renders substantial advice with respect preparation of
a tax return. IRC §6694.
Ill. Professional standards also govern the tax lawyer's conduct in advising on
return positions.
A. State disciplinary rules govern lawyer conduct generally.
B. These are administered by state disciplinary bodies according to the
rules in each state.
C. State rules, in turn, are greatly influenced by the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and their predecessors, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
1. Although these ABA pronouncements have no binding effect in
and of themselves, they have greatly influenced state disciplinary
rules, having been adopted in whole or in part by state
disciplinary systems.
2. In the tax area, the ABA has promulgated three influential
pronouncements:
a. Opinion 314 (controversies and tax return positions)
b. Opinion 346 (tax shelter opinions)
c. Opinion 85-352 (tax return positions)
3. These form the basis for the professional standards governing tax
practice.
IV. The Treasury also promulgates standards for practice before the Internal
Revenue Service in Circular 230.
A. Proposals for revised tax advice standards in Circular 230 are currently
under consideration, although the Treasury may have them on the back-
burner for the time being.
B. Originally proposed revisions would have placed a substantial authority
standard on the tax practitioner for tax return advice, identical to the
substantial authority prong of the accuracy-related penalty.
C. However, many now expect the Circular 230 standard ultimately to be
similar to the ABA "realistic possibility of success" (RPOS) standard"
promulgated in Opinion 88-352.
ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES
I. The Improved Penalty and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT) imposes a
single accuracy-related penalty at a rate of 20 percent. §6662(a).
A. The §6662 penalty applies to any portion of any underpayment that is
attributable to:
1. Negligence, or careless, reckless, or intentional disregard -of
rules and regulations;
2. Any substantial understatement of income tax;
3. Any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1
(income tax);
a. Formerly called a valuation overstatement;
b. The penalty jumps to 40 percent in the case of a gross (400
percent of correct value) valuation misstatement;
4. Any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities;
5. Any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.
§6662(b).
B. The penalties are not cumulative:
1. If the requirements are met (e.g., the amount of tax involved is
large enough) to implicate the substantial understatement
penalty, that penalty will apply;
2. If the requirements to implicate the substantial understatement
penalty are not met, the negligence or disregard penalty will
apply.
3. Both penalties will not apply to the same understatement. Reg.
§1.6662-2(c).
4. Also, the accuracy-related penalty does not apply to any portion
of an underpayment that is due to fraud. Reg. §1.6662-2(a).
5. The accuracy-related penalty applies only if a return is filed, but
both the §6651 failure to file penalty and the accuracy-related
penalty may be applied to a late return. Reg. §1.6662-2(a).
C. The penalties do not apply to an underpayment where there was
"reasonable cause" and the taxpayer acted in "good faith" with respect
to the underpayment (RCGF exception). §6664(c).
D. This outline will deal with the negligence, disregard, and substantial
understatement portions of the penalty.
E. Final regulations dealing with these penalties were published in the
Federal Register on December 31, 1991 at 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492. T.D.
8381 (filed Dec. 30, 1991)
1. The final regulations are generally applicable to returns due after
December 31, 1989.
2. Certain provisions (primarily relating to adequate disclosure) are
applicable to returns due after December 31, 1991.
II. The regulations describe when the IRS will assess the 20 percent penalty for
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations with respect to an
understatement of income tax. Reg. §1.6662-3(a).
A. Negligence includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable
care in the preparation of a tax return. Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(1).
B. Negligence also includes failure to keep adequate books and records. Id.
C. Courts have generally applied the tort law reasonably prudent test in
determining taxpayer negligence.
1. The reasonably prudent test in turn requires a taxpayer to show
a reasonable basis for the return position.
2. A return position that is "arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail
in court" satisfies the reasonable basis standard. Reg. §1.6662-
3(d)(2).
3. The taxpayer has the burden of proof on the issue of negligence.
D. Negligence is strongly indicated where a taxpayer fails to:
1. Include on an income tax return an amount of income shown on
an information return (e.g. form 1099 or 1065 K-i);
2. Make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a
deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a
reasonable person to be too good to be true;
a. Comments on the proposed regulations criticized the "too
good to be true" standard on the ground it is too subjective.
b. IRS retained the standard because it "expresses in
understandable terms a typical form of negligent behavior".
T.D. 8381, Preamble.
3. Treat partnership items on a return in a manner consistent with
the treatment on the partnership return;
4. Treat Subchapter S items on a return in a manner consistent
with the treatment on the corporation return. Reg. §1.6662-
3(b)(1).
E. Defenses to negligence penalty:
1. Taxpayer has a reasonable basis for the position. Reg. §1.6662-
3(b)(1).
a. Arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in court;
b. More than a 10 percent but less than a 33 percent chance
of succeeding.
(1) The stated percentages are gleaned from various
commentaries.
(2) Many doubt the efficacy of attempting to state
return standards in terms of percentages.
2. Taxpayer shows that the state of the law was unsettled,
provided the taxpayer's position was tenable and made in good
faith.
3. Taxpayer shows reasonable reliance on the advice of a tax
professional.
4. Taxpayer makes adequate disclosure.
a. The disclosure defense does not apply if the position is
frivolous.
(1) A position is frivolous if it is "patently improper."
Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(3).
(2) Comments on the proposed regulations criticized
this definition for not including a bad faith
component.
(3) IRS rejected these comments on the ground that a
purely objective standard was most appropriate.
(4) Query: Is "patently improper" really objective?
(5) The IRS also rejected a "not litigable" test as too
lawyer-oriented. T.D. 8381, Preamble
b. Disclosure must be made on a properly completed Form
8275 or 8275-R (The "Please Audit Me Now" Form). Reg.
§1.6662-3(c)(2).
(1) Unlike the substantial understatement penalty, the
regulations do not provide for avoidance of the
negligence (or disregard) penalty by disclosure in
accordance with an annual revenue procedure. Id.
(2) Neither do the regulations provide for disclosure by
means of a statement attached to the return. Id.
c. Disclosure of recurring items such as the basis of
depreciable property must be made in each year in which
the item is taken into account. Reg. §1.6662-4(f)(2).
d. Carrybacks and carryovers:
(1) Disclosure is adequate with respect to an item which
is included in any loss, deduction or credit that is
carried to another year (carryback or carryover year)
only if made in connection with the return for the
year in which the carryback or carryover arises (loss
or credit year).
(2) Disclosure is not also required in connection with
the return for the carryback or carryover year. Reg.
§6662-4(f)(4).
e. Disclosure in the case of items attributable to pass-
through entities is generally made on the return of the
pass-through entity on form 8275 or 8275-R. Reg. §1.6662-
4(f)(5)
(1) An individual partner, S shareholder, etc. may also
may make such disclosure.
(2) The individual taxpayer must attach the disclosure
to the taxpayer's individual return and also file a
copy with the Internal Revenue Service Center with
which the return of the entity is required to be filed.
Id.
5. The taxpayer shows reasonable cause and good faith (RCGF)
a. The determination as to whether taxpayer qualifies for
RCGF is made on the basis of facts and circumstances.
Reg. §1.6664-4(b)
b. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's
effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability. Id.
c. Contemporaneous documentation by the taxpayer will be
a significant factor in establishing RCGF.
d. Circumstances that indicate RCGF include an honest
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light
of the experience, knowledge and education of the
taxpayer.
(1) An isolated computational or transcriptional error is
not inconsistent with RCGF.
(2) Reliance on an information return or the advice of a
professional does not necessarily demonstrate RCGF.
(3) Nor does reliance on facts that, unknown to the
taxpayer, are incorrect necessarily indicate RCGF.
(4) However, reliance on an information return,
professional advice or other facts does constitute
RCGF if the taxpayer's reliance was reasonable, and
the taxpayer acted in good faith.
(5) A taxpayer's reliance on erroneous information
reported on an information return indicates RCGF,
provided the taxpayer did not know or have reason
to know the information was incorrect;
(a) A taxpayer knows or has reason to know that
such information is incorrect if the
information is inconsistent with other
information reported to the taxpayer or
inconsistent with the taxpayer's actual
knowledge of the transaction.
(b) This knowledge includes knowledge of the
terms of the taxpayer's employment
relationship or of the rate of return on a
payor's obligation. Reg. §1.6664-4(b)(1).
e. In the case of an understatement that is related to the
return of a pass-through entity, RCGF by the entity
generally is imputed to the taxpayer.
(1) RCGF is not imputed from the entity to the taxpayer
if there are factors that indicate the taxpayer did
not individually act with RCGF.
(2) Similarly, bad faith or a lack of reasonable cause
also may be imputed from the entity to the taxpayer.
Reg. §1.6664-4(c)
6. Disregard of rules or regulations includes any careless, reckless
or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Reg. §1.6662-
3(b)(2)
7. The phrase "rules or regulations" includes:
a. Provisions of the IRC;
b. Temporary or final (but not proposed) Treasury regulations
issued under the IRC;
c. Revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of proposed
rulemaking). Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(2)
8. Comments on the proposed regulations criticized inclusion of
revenue rulings on the list because:
a. A revenue ruling does not constitute a "rule" under the
Administrative Procedure Act; and
b. A revenue ruling is only the contention of one party and is
not subject to the give-and-take of a public comment
process. T.D. 8381, Preamble.
9. The IRS rejected this objection based on the legislative history of
the 1976 Tax Reform Act and the fact that revenue rulings were
expressly listed as "rules" under former Reg. §1.6694-1
(concerning preparer penalties). Id.
10. The regulations do not explicitly include Revenue Procedures on
the list.
a. However, the preamble states that revenue procedures are
not listed, because "they may or may not be treated as
'rules or regulations' depending on all facts and
circumstances." Id.
b. This provides scant guidance, but presumably revenue
procedures that contain substantive rules will be "rules" for
this purpose while revenue procedures that contain mere
directions to IRS personnel (e.g., requirements for
information to be furnished in obtaining a ruling) will not
be "rules."
F. A disregard of rules or regulations is:
1. 'Careless if the taxpayer does not exercise reasonable diligence
to determine the correctness of a return position that is contrary
to a rule or regulation;
2. Reckless if the taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine
whether a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances which
demonstrate a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe;
3. Intentional if the taxpayer knows of the rule or regulation that
is disregarded. Reg. §1.6662-3(a), (b)(2).
G. Defenses to disregard penalty-
1. In the case of a position contrary to a ruling or notice, the
penalty will not apply if the taxpayer's position has a realistic
possibility of being sustained on its merits (RPOS). § 1.6662-
3(a), (b)(2).
a. This standard is the same as the standard for the IRC
§6694(a) preparer penalty.
b. According to the regulations, it requires an approximately
33 percent possibility of success. Reg. §1.6694-2(b)(1).
c. It is similar but not strictly identical to the ABA Formal
Opinion 85-352 standard infra.
d. A comment on the proposed regulations objected to use of
the RPOS standard in this context, suggesting that
reasonable basis would be more appropriate.
e. The IRS rejected this suggestion, stating that the RPOS
standard is a taxpayer favorable one, since there is no
statutory requirement for any such exception to the
disregard penalty. T.D. 8381, Preamble
f. There is no RPOS exception for disregard of a
regulation. Reg. §1.6662-3(a),(b).
2. The penalty does not apply if the taxpayer makes adequate
disclosure.
a. In the case of a regulation, disclosure must be made on a
form 8275-R and represent a good faith challenge to the
validity of the regulation. Reg. §1.6662-3(c)(1),(2).
b. In the case of a ruling or notice disclosure must be made
on Form 8275. Reg. §1.6662-3(c)(2).
(1) Comments on the proposed regulations argued that
disclosure on the return in accordance with an
annual revenue procedure should also be adequate.
T.D. 8381, Preamble.
(2) The IRS did not accept this argument based on
legislative history and a concern for uniformity. Id.
3. The penalty does not apply if the taxpayer establishes
reasonable cause and good faith
a. In the case of a regulation the statute and regulations do
not explicitly state that the RCGF defense is available.
b. Nevertheless, an overall reading of §§6662 and 6664, along
with the regulations thereunder, may support its
availability. See IRC §6664(c); Bischoff, Highlights of the
New Taxpayer Accuracy-Related Penalty Rules, The Tax
Advisor, June 1992 at 331.
c. In the case of rulings and notices the RCGF defense also
appears to be available, for example, where the taxpayer
takes a position contrary to a revenue ruling after the Tax
Court has repudiated the ruling. Id.
H. Carrybacks and carryovers
1. Because the penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations is measured by the amount of understated tax, the
carryback or carryover of a negligently generated loss, deduction,
or credit will result in a penalty for the year to which the loss,
deduction, or credit is carried (carryback or carryover year).
2. Hence, the taxpayer's negligence or disregard in one year (the loss
year) follows the resulting loss, deduction, or credit to the year in
which it results in an invalid tax reduction. §1.6662-3(d).
Ill. If any portion of an underpayment of any income tax is attributable to a
substantial understatement of such income tax, there is added to the tax
an amount equal to 20 percent of such portion. Reg. §1.6662-4(a).
A. An understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of:
1. 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the
taxable year; or
2. $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of a corporation other than an S
corporation or a personal holding company). §1.6662-4(b).
B. The definition of understatement is expressed as the formula
understatement = X - (Y - Z) where X = the amount of tax required to
be shown on the return; Y = the amount of tax imposed which is shown
on the return; and Z = any rebate. §1.6662-4(b)(2)
C. The substantial understatement penalty applies to any portion of an
understatement for a year to which a loss, deduction, or credit is carried
(carryback or carryover year) that is attributable to a tainted item for
the year in which the carryback or carryover of the loss, deduction, or
credit arises (loss or credit year). Reg. §1.6662-4(c)(1).
1. The determination of whether an understatement is substantial
for a carryback or carryover year is made with respect to the
return of the carryback or carryover year. Id.
2. Tainted items are taken into account with items arising in a
carryback or carryover year to determine whether the
understatement is substantial for that year.
3. These rules represent a change from the proposed regulations
which were subject to severe criticism.
4. Example: X, a corporation properly reports $20 million of taxable
income for 1991 and pays tax of $6,800,000 (34% rate). For 1992,
X reports zero tax liability and a net operating loss ("NOL") of
$10,030,000, which is carried back to 1991. The NOL reduces X's
tax liability for 1991 to $3,389,800. On audit, the IRS reduces X's
NOL for 1992 by $30,000 to $10,000,000. Accordingly the IRS
increases X's 1991 taxes by 34% of 30,000 or $10,200. X's correct
tax liability for 1991 is thus $3,400,000. Comments to the
Proposed Regulations, submitted by the ABA Tax Section Civil
Penalties Task Force, quoted in I Bernard Wolfman, James P.
Holden, and Kenneth L. Harris, Standards of Tax Practice
5006.024 [hereafter cited as Standards of Tax Practice].
a. Under the proposed regulations, X would be liable for the
substantial understatement penalty since $10,200 exceeds
ten percent of the zero tax owed for 1992. Id.
b. Under the final regulations, the determination of
substantiality would be made with respect to the carryback
year 1991, and hence the penalty would not apply ($10,200
is less than 10 percent of 1991 tax liability).
D. Except with respect to tax shelter items, an understatement is
reduced by the portion of the understatement:
1. For which there is substantial authority; or
2. With respect to which there is adequate disclosure. Reg.
§1.6662-4(a).
3. Example: T files a 1990 income tax return showing taxable
income of $20,000 and a tax liability of $6,000 (assuming a 30
percent tax rate). Audit adjustments increase the taxable income
to $50,000 and the tax liability to $15,000. There was substantial
authority for a non-tax shelter item that accounted for $8,000 of
the $30,000 increase in taxable income.
a. The amount of tax shown on T's return is determined as if
the item for which there was substantial authority had
been given proper treatment.
b. Hence, the amount of tax treated as shown on T's return
is $8,400 (30 percent of $28,000). The amount of the
understatement is $6,600 ($15,000 tax required to be
shown on the return minus $8,400 treated as shown on the
return). The amount of the penalty would be $1,320 (20
percent of $6,600). Standards of Tax Practice
1208.0312. See Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(1).
E. Tax shelter items receive more stringent treatment:
1. A tax shelter is a partnership or other entity, an investment plan
or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if the principal
purpose of such plan or arrangement, based on objective evidence,
is to avoid or evade Federal income tax. Reg. §1.6662-4(g)(2)(i)
2. An item is a tax shelter item if the item is directly or indirectly
attributable to the principal purpose of a tax shelter to avoid or
evade Federal income tax. Reg. §1.6662-4(g)(3).
3. Tax shelter items are treated as if they were properly shown on
the return only if.
a. There is substantial authority for the position; and
b. The taxpayer reasonably believed at the time the return
was filed that the taxpayer's position was more likely than
not the proper tax treatment. Reg. §1.6662-4(g)(1).
(1) A taxpayer is considered reasonably to believe that
the tax treatment of an item is more likely than not
the proper tax treatment if:
(a) The taxpayer analyzes the pertinent facts and
authorities and reasonably concludes that
there is a greater than 50 percent
likelihood that the tax treatment of the item
will be upheld if challenged by the IRS; or
(b) The taxpayer, in good faith, relies on the
opinion of a professional tax advisor, if the
opinion is based on the advisor's analysis of
the pertinent facts and authorities and
unambiguously states that the advisor
concludes that there is a greater than 50
percent likelihood that the tax treatment of
the item will be upheld if challenged by the
IRS. Reg. §1.6662-4(g)(4).
4. Disclosure made with respect to a tax shelter item does not
affect the amount of an understatement. Id.
F. The RCGF exception (see infra G.4.) applies to the substantial
understatement penalty. Reg. §1.6662-4(a).
G. Defenses against substantial understatement penalty:
1. The understatement is insubstantial because it does not meet
the $5,000 ($10,000 for a corporation other than a personal
holding company or S corporation) or 10 percent of tax liability
threshold.
2. The taxpayer had substantial authority for the return position.
a. The substantial authority standard is:
(1) An objective standard involving an analysis of the
law and application of the law to relevant facts;
(2) Less stringent than the more likely than not
standard (greater than 50 percent likelihood of
success), but more stringent than a reasonable basis
standard. Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(2).
b. The regulations do not explicitly compare the RPOS
standard to the substantial authority standard.
c. Many believe substantial authority is more stringent than
RPOS, so that the substantial authority standard may boil
down to about a 40 percent chance of success.
d. The audit lottery odds are not relevant in determining
whether the substantial authority (or reasonable basis)
standard is met. Id.
e. There is substantial authority for a position only if the
weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is
substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary treatment.
(1) All authorities relevant to the tax treatment of the
item in question must be taken into account and
weighed in light of the pertinent facts and
circumstances.
(2) There may be substantial authority for more than
one position with respect to the same item.
(3) The taxpayer's subjective belief is not relevant to the
issue of whether there actually is substantial
authority, because the standard is an objective one.
Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
f. The types of authority that may be used in determining
if there is substantial authority are:
(1) Applicable provisions of the IRC and other statutory
provisions;
(2) Proposed, temporary, and final regulations
construing such statutes;
(3) Revenue rulings and revenue procedures;
(4) Tax treaties and regulations thereunder, and
Treasury Department and other official explanations
of such treaties;
(5) Court cases;
(6) Congressional intent, as reflected in committee
reports, joint explanatory statements of managers
included in conference committee reports, and floor
statements made prior to enactment by one of a
bill's managers;
(7) General Explanations of tax legislation prepared by
the Joint Committee on Taxation (the Blue Book);
(8) Private letter rulings and technical advice
memoranda issued after October 31, 1976;
(9) AODs and GCMs issued after March 12, 1981;
(10) GCMs published in pre-1955 volumes of the
Cumulative Bulletin;
(11) IRS information or press releases;
(12) Notices, announcements and other administrative
pronouncements published by the IRS in the
Cumulative Bulletin. Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
g. A taxpayer also may have substantial authority for a
position that is supported only by a well-reasoned
construction of the applicable statutory provision.
(1) This may be all that is available in the case of new
or obscure provisions for which there is no
authoritative guidance.
(2) The "well reasoned construction" formulation is
obviously scant solace to a practitioner dealing with
a deluge of tax legislation. See ABA Tax Section
Comments on Circular 230 (Feb. 12, 1987):
In view of the massive amounts of
recent tax legislation, the delays in
issuance of regulations and the limited
coverage of regulations that have been
issued, and the fact that many
problems arising under the Code of
long standing have not been the subject
of litigation or published rulings, the
result is that no authority of any kind,
within the restricted meaning given
that term by the section 6661
regulations, exists with respect to a
large proportion of issues involved in
tax returns.
(3) Although the scope of available authority has been
expanded under the current regulations from the
time of the ABA Tax Section comments (see infra)
the fact remains that there are still many provisions
for which no authority of any kind exists.
h. The regulations also specify materials that are not
authority:
(1) Conclusions reached in treatises, legal periodicals,
legal opinions, or opinions rendered by tax
professionals are not authority. d.
(a) However, the authorities underlying such
expressions of opinion where applicable to the
facts of a given case may give rise to
substantial authority. Id.
(b) Query - Would a "well-reasoned construction"
of an applicable statute in a treatise or article
constitute an authority underlying an opinion
expressed by the author?
(c) It seems unfortunate that conclusions reached
in respected secondary sources are completely
excluded from the scope of applicable
authority.
i) They are authority for purposes of
applying the ABA Formal Opinion 85-
352 RPOS standard.
ii) A lawyer might well be under an
obligation to consult such sources in
order to comply with Formal Opinion
85-352, yet the regulations restrict use
of these sources to their underlying
authorities.
(2) An earlier authority to the extent it has been
overruled or modified, implicitly or explicitly, by a
body with the power to overrule or modify the
earlier authority ceases to be an authority. Id.
(3) The original version of this rule was roundly
criticized in comments on the proposed regulations
on the ground that they were inconsistent with the
rule that all authorities should be considered in
determining whether substantial authority is
present.
(4) In response to these criticisms, the final regulations
"clarify that an authority ceases to be an authority
once it is overruled or modified, explicitly or
implicitly, by an authority of the same or higher
source." T.D. 8381 Preamble.
(a) Hence, for example, a District Court opinion
is not an authority if overruled by the United
States Court of Appeals for that District.
Reg. §1.662-4(d)(3)(iii).
(b) By the same token, an opinion of the Tax
Court is not considered overruled by a United
States Court of Appeals to which the taxpayer
does not have the right of appeal, unless the
Tax Court adopts the holding of the Court of
Appeals. Id.
(c) A private letter ruling is not authority if
revoked or if inconsistent with a subsequent
proposed regulation, revenue ruling, or other
administrative pronouncement of the IRS. Id.
(5) The regulations also provide a general rule (to which
rule (b) above appears to be an exception) that the
applicability of court cases to the taxpayer by reason
of the taxpayer's residence in a particular
jurisdiction is not taken into account in determining
whether there is substantial authority for a position.
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(B).
(6) Another exception to the general rule of not
considering the taxpayer's geographical location is
that there is substantial authority for a position if
the position is supported by controlling precedent of
a United States Court of Appeals to which the
taxpayer has a right of appeal with respect to the
position. Id. See Golsen v. Comm'r 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affirmed 445 F.2d. 895 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
(7) Comments on the proposed regulations also argued
that proposed regulations are too tentative to justify
the rule that proposed regulations supersede prior,
inconsistent letter rulings.
(8) Nevertheless, the IRS retained the rule on the
ground that, "Proposed regulations are subject to a
higher level of review than private letter rulings,
and, therefore, reflect the current position of the
Service more accurately than previously issued
private letter rulings." T.D. 8381, Preamble.
(9) Special rules apply in the case of written
determinations issued to the taxpayer.
(a) There is substantial authority for a position if
the position is supported by the conclusion of
a ruling or determination letter (as defined in
Reg. §301.6110-2(d),(e)) issued to the
taxpayer, by the conclusion of a technical
advice memorandum in which the taxpayer is
named, or by an affirmative statement in a
revenue agent's report with respect to a prior
taxable year of the taxpayer. Reg. §1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iv)(A).
(b) The preceding rule will not apply if there was
a misstatement or omission of a material fact
or the facts that subsequently develop are
materially different from the facts on which
the written determination is based; Id. or
(c) The written determination was modified or
revoked after the date of issuance by:
i) A notice to the taxpayer to whom the
written determination was issued;
ii) The enactment of legislation or
ratification of a tax treaty;
iii) A decision of the United States
Supreme Court;
iv) The issuance of temporary or final
regulations; or
v) The issuance of a revenue ruling,
revenue procedure, or other statement
published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin. Id.
(d) Written determinations generally cease to be
authority on the date and to the extent one of
the above events occurs to modify or revoke
the written determination. Id.
i) There is an exception to this rule for
modifications or revocations that occur
on account of misstatements of fact or
subsequent development of different
facts. Id.
ii) The regulations also call attention to
the duty of IRS under IRC §6404(f) in
certain cases to abate a penalty that is
attributable to erroneous written
advice furnished to a taxpayer by an
officer or employee of the IRS. Id.
The weight accorded an authority depends on its relevance
and persuasiveness, and the type of document providing
the authority. Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii).
(1) Authorities must be examined to determine whether
they are distinguishable on their facts.
(2) Authorities that merely state conclusions are less
weighty than authorities that contain well-reasoned
analysis.
(3) The type of document is also relevant:
(a) For example, a published revenue ruling is
accorded more weight than a letter ruling
concerning the same issue.
(b) An older letter ruling, TCM, GCM, or AOD
must be accorded less weight than a more
recent one.
i) Any of the above documents that is
more than 10 years old generally is
accorded very little weight.
ii) However, the persuasiveness and
relevance of a document, viewed in
light of subsequent developments,
should be taken into account as well as
the age of the document. Id.
iii) The proposed regulations would have
ruled out entirely documents more
than 10 years old.
iv) In response to critical comments the
IRS retreated slightly to the current
formulation. T.D. 8381, Preamble
The time for determining substantial authority is at
either:
(1) the time the return containing the position is filed;
or
(2) the last day of the taxable year to which the return
relates. Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C).
(3) For example, if there is substantial authority for a
position on December 31, but the authority is
revoked or overruled prior to April 15, the taxpayer
still has substantial authority for the position for
purposes of the substantial understatement penalty.
k. For returns due before January 1, 1990 there is substantial
authority for a position if the standard is met under either
the new expanded or the old narrower list of authorities.
Reg. §1.6662-4(d)(3)(v).
(1) Under either list of authorities, authorities both for
and against the position must be taken into account.
Id.
(2) This rule, which allows the IRS to use authorities
that have been added to the expanded list against a
taxpayer, has been criticized by some commentators
as unfair to taxpayers and contrary to the legislative
history which states that the legislation expands the
list of authorities "upon which taxpayers may rely."
See Banoff, Determining and Weighing Valid Legal
Authority to Avoid Accuracy-Related and Preparer
Penalties: The Proposed Regulations Continue the
Controversy, 69 Taxes 259, 267-68 (1991).
3. The taxpayer makes adequate disclosure:
a. The disclosure defense does not apply if the position is
frivolous. Reg. §1.6662-4(e)(2)(1).
b. The disclosure defense does not apply to tax shelter items.
Reg. Id.
c. Disclosure can be made on form 8275 and 8275-R as
delineated above. Reg. §1.6662-4(f)(1).
d. For certain items, disclosure also can be made on the
return in accordance with applicable forms and
instructions. Reg. §1.6662-4(f)(2).
(1) Rev. Proc. 92-23, 1992-13 I.R.B. 21, currently
provides authorization for such disclosure in certain
circumstances.
(2) If the Revenue Procedure does not provide for
disclosure of an item, disclosure is adequate only if
made on Form 8275 or Form 8275-R. Reg. §1.6662-
4(f)(2).
e. There is no provision in the regulations for disclosure on a
statement attached to the return.
(1) Comments on the proposed regulations criticized
this omission.
(a) The statute itself seems to authorize such
disclosure by stating that disclosure can be
made "in the return or in a statement
attached to the return." §6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)
(emphasis added).
(b) Schirmer v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 277 (1987),
indicated that forms of disclosure other than
those currently listed in the regulations are
acceptable. See Banoff, Final Regulations on
Accuracy-Related Penalties: Taxpavers
Beware, The Feds Are Out There/There's
Danger in the Air -- Be Aggressive If You
Dare, 70 Taxes 178, 200-201 (1992).
(2) The Service responded to these criticisms by stating
that there is no indication in IMPACT that Congress
intended to permit disclosure on the return itself,
and it is in the interest of both taxpayers and IRS to
have a uniform disclosure regime. Id.; T.D. 8381,
Preamble.
f. Disclosure of recurring items such as the basis of
depreciable property must be made in each year in which
the item is taken into account. Reg. §1.6662-4(f)(3).
g. Carrybacks and carryovers:
(1) Disclosure is adequate with respect to an item which
is included in any loss, deduction, or credit that is
carried to another year (carryback or carryover year)
only if made in connection with the return for the
year in which the carryback or carryover arises (loss
or credit year).
(2) Disclosure is not also required in connection with
the return for the carryback or carryover year. Reg.
§1.6662-4(f)(4).
h. Disclosure in the case of items attributable to pass-
through entities is generally made on the return of the
pass-through entity.
(1) An individual partner, S shareholder, etc. also may
make such disclosure.
(2) The taxpayer must attach the disclosure to the
taxpayer's individual return and also file a copy with
the Internal Revenue Service Center with which the
return of the entity is required to be filed. Reg.
§1.6662-4(f)(5).
4. The taxpayer shows reasonable cause and good faith (RCGF)
a. The same considerations apply in the case of the
substantial understatement penalty as applied in the case
of the negligence penalty supra.
b. Some commentators have suggested that the substantial
understatement penalty is basically a no-fault penalty.
Standards of Tax Practice 208.0312.
c. Note that to the extent a defense of RCGF is available, the
substantial understatement penalty ceases pro tanto to be
a no-fault penalty.
IV. If any portion of an underpayment is attributable to a substantial valuation
misstatement under chapter 1 (income tax) of the Code, there is added to the
tax an amount equal to 20 percent of such portion. Reg. §1.6662-5(a).
A. No penalty is imposed on a portion of an underpayment, unless the
aggregate of all portions of the underpayment attributable to substantial
or gross valuation misstatements exceeds $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of
a corporation other than an S corporation or personal holding company).
Id.
B. The RCGF defense is available in the case of a valuation misstatement.
Id.
C. No disclosure defense is available in the case of a valuation
misstatement. Id.
D. There is a substantial valuation misstatement if the value or adjusted
basis of any property claimed on a return under Chapter 1 of the IRC
is 200 percent or more of the correct amount. Reg. §1.6662-5(e)(1).
E. The penalty increases to 40 percent in the case of a gross valuation
misstatement.
1. There is a gross valuation misstatement if the value or adjusted
basis of any property claimed on a return under Chapter 1 of the
IRC equals 400 percent or more of the correct amount. Reg.
§1.6662-5(e)(2).
2. The value or adjusted basis claimed on a return of property with
a correct value or adjusted basis of zero is considered to be 400
percent or more of such amount and, hence, subject to the 40
percent penalty. Reg. §1.6662-5(g).
F. The term property refers to both tangible and intangible property.
1. Tangible property includes property such as land, buildings,
fixtures, and inventory.
2. Intangible property includes property such as goodwill, covenants
not to compete, leaseholds, patents, contract rights, and choses in
action. Reg. §1.6662-5(e)(3).
G. In the case of a pass-through entity:
1. The determination of whether there is a substantial or gross
valuation misstatement is made at the entity level.
2. However, determination of the dollar limitation ($5,000 or
$10,000) is made at the taxpayer level. Reg. §1.6662-5(h)(1).
ABA FORMAL OPINION 85-352
The ethical standards governing tax law practice are promulgated mainly in
three formal ABA opinions:
A. Opinion 314, dealing with controversies and with tax return positions;
B. Opinion 346, dealing with tax shelter opinions;
C. Opinion 85-352, dealing with tax return positions.
D. This outline mainly considers Opinion 85-352.
II. The standards of tax practice for attorneys were first formalized in Opinion
314 issued in 1965 (reprinted at 51 ABA J. 671 (1965)).
A. Opinion 314 dealt with both:
1. Advising clients on positions to be taken on tax returns; and
2. Dealing with IRS after an audit has begun.
B. Opinion 314 still has effect with respect to dealing with the IRS after an
audit has begun, since Opinion 85-352 only superseded Opinion 314 to
the extent that Opinion 85-352 sets out new standards for advising tax
return positions.
C. Opinion 314 took the position that the status of the IRS was basically
that of an adversary at both the return and audit stages.
1. According to Opinion 314, the IRS in an audit situation is aitrepresentative of one of the parties" and not a "true tribunal, nor
even a quasi-judicial institution." Id. at 671
a. The lawyer has a duty "not to make false assertions of
fact."
b. Moreover, the lawyer "is under a duty not to mislead the
Internal Revenue Service deliberately and affirmatively,
either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting his
client to mislead."
c. Nevertheless, "as an advocate before a service which itself
represents the adversary point of view" the lawyer is under
no duty to disclose weaknesses in the client's case. Id. at
672
2. Opinion 314 carried this view of the IRS as adversary to the tax
return preparation stage:
a. According to Opinion 314, a lawyer asked to advise a client
in the course of preparation of the tax return "may freely
urge the statement of positions most favorable to the client
just as long as there is reasonable basis for those
positions." Id. (emphasis added)
b. Moreover, "IW]here the lawyer believes there is a
reasonable basis for a position that a particular transaction
does not result in taxable income, or that certain
expenditures are properly deductible as expenses, the
lawyer has no duty to advise that riders be attached to the
client's tax return explaining the circumstances
surrounding the transaction or the expenditures." Id.
c.. Opinion 314 did not explicitly mention a good faith
requirement, although the concept of good faith might be
taken as implicit in the reasonable basis standard.
3. The reasonable basis standard originally may have been intended
to set a fairly high standard. See Standards of Tax Practice
214.02; Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's
Federal Tax Return: An Analysis of the Section 6694(a) Standard,
47 Tax Notes 971, 972 (1990).
a. Nevertheless, respect for the standard gradually eroded
over the next 20 years.
b. Some only half facetiously referred to the standard as the
"giggle test" or the "laugh test" (if the lawyer can advance
the position without giggling or laughing).
c. Presumably the laugh test was even less than stringent
than the giggle test and further erosion would have led to
a guffaw test.
d. By 1985, the reasonable basis standard had diminished to
an understanding by many that it justified the "use of any
colorable claim on a tax return to justify the exploitation of
the lottery of the tax return audit selection process." ABA
Section of Taxation, Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion
314, reprinted in Wolfman and Holden, Ethical Problems
in Federal Taxation 71 (1985) [hereafter cited as Ethical
Problems].
(1) The concern was that taxpayers were burying
questionable positions on their returns and
depending on the audit lottery to protect them.
(2) Moreover, the tax shelter industry exacerbated the
problem, and the reasonable basis standard provided
fraud insurance for investors in shaky tax shelters.
See Discussion on "Questionable Positions" 32 Tax
Law. 13 (1978).
(3) IRS Commissioner Kurtz asserted that a change was
in order and suggested that a no-fault type penalty
for undisclosed tax return positions might be
appropriate to prevent exploitation of the audit
lottery. See Id.; Kurtz, Remarks to the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, reprinted
in Ethical Problems at 59; Durst, The Tax
Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 30 Fla. L. Rev.
1027, 1066 (1987)
Ill. The ABA Tax Section responded to the perceived problem by suggesting
revisions to Opinion 314. Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314 supra.
A. The Tax Section proposal disavowed the adversarial approach of Opinion
314.
1. The proposal explicitly stated that, "A tax return is not a
submission in an adversarial proceeding." Id. at 71.
a. The nature of the tax return audit process dictates that the
IRS will not pick most returns for audit.
b. This means that a taxpayer who resolves all doubts in the
taxpayer's favor always has an advantage, because the IRS
probably will not audit the return.
c. The proposal stated, "The complications of the tax law, the
inadequacy of Internal Revenue Service audits, the
impracticability of training revenue agents to achieve
expertness and the flexibility available to the taxpayer in
legitimately resolving to his own advantage numerous
doubtful issue resulting from those complexities, impose a
substantial burden on the government. Id. at 71
2. The proposal asserted that a higher standard than the minimum
to avoid fraud should be expected of the tax lawyer in rendering
advice on return positions.
a. The standard adopted by the proposal was that in order to
advise a taxpayer to assert a position on a return, "the
position must be a meritorious one." Id. at 73 (emphasis
added).
b. A position is meritorious if "it is advanced in good faith, as
evidenced by a practical and realistic possibility of
success if litigated." Id.
c. "The lawyer must honestly entertain a belief that the
position well may be held to be correct, either on the
merits of existing authority or by reversal of existing
authority." Id.
3. The proposal required the lawyer to withdraw from
representation where a client insists on reporting a position that
does not meet the standard. Id. at 74.
IV. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility took
the Tax Section proposal as the basis for Opinion 85-352, which is now the
basic ethical pronouncement for lawyers on advising tax return positions. ABA
Opinion 85-352, reprinted in Standards of Tax Practice at Appendix 91203
and at 31 Tax Lawyer 631 (1986).
A. However, the Committee made several modifications to the Tax Section
proposal.
B. The Committee eliminated the requirement that the position be
meritorious which had been the basis of the Tax Section's standard.
C. The Committee also eliminated the sentence in the Tax Section Revision
that explicitly stated that, "A tax return is not a submission in an
adversary proceeding." See Durst, supra at 1042-45.
1. Opinion 85-352 skirts the issue.
2. It states that, "Although the Model Rules distinguish between the
roles of advisor and advocate, both roles are involved here, and
the ethical standards applicable to them provide relevant
guidance." Opinion 85-352 at 632.
D. The Committee changed the Tax Section's requirement that there be a
practical and realistic possibility of success to a requirement that
there be some realistic possibility of success. Id. at 633.
V. A special Task Force of the Tax Section in turn issued a document placing its
interpretation of Opinion 85-352 on the record. Report of the Special Task
Force on Formal Opinion 85-352. reprinted at Standards of Tax Practice
Appendix 204 and at 39 Tax Law. 639 (1986) [hereafter cited as Task Force
Report.
A. The Task Force Report was approved by the Tax Section Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice and approved by the Council of the Section of
Taxation.
1. However, the Task Force Report was not adopted by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
Standards of Tax Practice 214.020.
2. Hence, its authoritative status is ambiguous.
B. Since ABA rules have effect only to the extent adopted by official state
disciplinary bodies, the ultimate weight accorded to the Task Force
Report will be decided by those bodies and the courts. Id.
VI. The standard for advising a tax return position is stated in Opinion 85-352 as
follows:
In summary, a lawyer may advise reporting a position on a
return even where the lawyer believes the position probably will
not prevail, there is no "substantial authority" in support of the
position, and there will be no disclosure of the position in the
return. However, the position to be asserted must be one which
the lawyer in good faith believes is warranted in existing law or
can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. This requires that there
is some realistic possibility of success if the matter is
litigated. Opinion 85-352 (emphasis added).
VII. Several points are notable with respect to this formulation:
A. The meritorious standard of the Tax Section proposal is eliminated.
B. Also eliminated is the Tax Section description of RPOS as requiring that
the possibility of success be "practical and realistic." See sura., III
A.2.B.
1. The Tax Section Task Force interpreting Opinion 85-352
attempted to minimize these differences.
2. It stated that a "possibility of success cannot be "realistic" if it is
only theoretical or impractical." Task Force Report at 638.
C. The foundation of the standard is good faith.
D. The subjective requirement of good faith is given an objective aspect by
requiring that there be "some realistic possibility of success if the matter
is litigated" (RPOS).
1. The lawyer need not believe that the position probably will
prevail (more likely than not standard); or
2. That the position is supported by substantial authority.
3. The likelihood of audit or detection is not a permissible
consideration.
E. The RPOS formulation is based on a litigation standard.
1. Opinion 85-352 cites ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1
which deals with the standard for bringing or defending a
proceeding.
2. The opinion itself refers to the possibility of success in litigation.
3. The opinion states that the "ethical standards governing the
conduct of a lawyer in advising a client on positions that can be
taken in a tax return are no different than those governing a
lawyer's conduct in advising or taking positions for a client in
other civil matters." Opinion 85-352.
F. Opinion 85-352 does not completely abandon the premise of Opinion 314
that the tax return process is adversarial in nature.
1. Opinion 85-352 states that both the role of advisor and the role
of advocate are involved.
2. It further states that in many cases "a lawyer must realistically
anticipate that the filing of the tax return may be the first step
in a process that may result in an adversarial relationship
between the client and the IRS." Id.
3. In contrast, the Task Force report suggests, "The Opinion does
not state that the general ethical guidelines governing advocacy
in litigation are determinative, or suggest that tax returns are
adversarial proceedings," and merely "blends" the ethical rules
governing advocacy and advising. Task Force Report at 640.
4. This may be stretching the actual words of Opinion 85-352 to suit
the Task Force's own attitude.
G. Opinion 85-352 does not state explicitly what the lawyer's duty is if the
RPOS standard is not met.
1. The Task Force Report indicates that the lawyer is under an
obligation to withdraw "from the engagement, at least to the
extent that it involves advice as to the position to be taken on the
return." Task Force Report at 639.
2. This is consistent with Model Rule 1.16(a) which provides that a
lawyer must withdraw if the representation will involve the
lawyer in a violation of the rules of professional conduct. See
Standards of Tax Practice 214.0241
3. There may be difficulty in determining the extent of the
engagement in this circumstance.
4. If the client desires to contest the issue, the position may be
advanced by payment of the tax and filing a refund claim.
a. Under Model Rule 3.1 the lawyer may assert a position in
litigation that is non-frivolous.
b. Hence, the lawyer may represent the client in refund
proceedings, even though the RPOS standard is not met, as
long as the claim is non-frivolous. Id.
5. Withdrawal may be difficult or impossible in situations where to
do so might amount to a breach of the duty of confidentiality.
6. Adequate disclosure may be an acceptable alternative to
withdrawal where there is a non-frivolous position that does not
meet the RPOS standard, but that is unclear. See jnfra, H.
H. Adequate disclosure performs an equivocal role in Opinion 85-352.
1. Where the RPOS standard is met, "the lawyer has no duty to
require as a condition of his or her continued representation that
riders be attached to the client's tax return explaining the
circumstances of the transaction." Id.
2. However, the Opinion also requires the lawyer to "counsel the
client as to whether the position is likely to be sustained by a
court if challenged by the IRS, as well as of the potential penalty
consequences to the client if the position is taken on the tax
return without disclosure." Id.
3. The Opinion further states that competent representation
requires that the lawyer determine if the substantial
understatement penalty is potentially applicable, and advise the
client of the possibility of avoiding the penalty by disclosure. Id.
4. If the position meets the RPOS standard and the client decides to
risk the substantial underpayment penalty by not disclosing, "the
lawyer has met his or her ethical responsibility" with respect to
the client." Id.
5. In all cases (both with respect to return preparation and
negotiating administrative settlements) the lawyer is under a
duty not "mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately
either by misstatements or by silence, or by permitting the client
to mislead." Id.
6. The Opinion does not explicitly state that disclosure exonerates
a position that fails to meet the RPOS standard (substandard
position).
7. The Task Force Report, by failing to state affirmatively that
disclosure cures a substandard position, implies that if the RPOS
standard is not met, disclosure will not cure the defect. Task
Force Report at 639-40.
8. The Task Force Report states, "Only if the position meets the
standard may the lawyer prepare the return, sign it, and present
it to the client." Id. at 639.
9. However, subsequently, the ABA Tax Section in comments on
proposed revisions to Treasury Circular 230 took the view that a
return position that does not meet the RPOS standard may be
taken provided:
a. The position is not frivolous; and is either
b. Adequately disclosed; or
c. Presented on an amended return filed as a claim for
refund. Standards of Tax Practice 1214.0242
10. Permitting adequate disclosure to cure a non-frivolous
substandard position would be consistent with the goal of
diminishing the role of the audit lottery.
a. The audit lottery was the problem that initiated the search
for a new tax return standard in the first place.
b. Hence, permitting disclosure would conform to the
purposes for issuance of Opinion 85-352.
Opinion 85-352 does not express the RPOS standard in numerical
percentage terms.
1. Nevertheless, a commonly accepted convention is that RPOS
requires about a one-in-three chance of success.
2. This formulation apparently derives from the Task Force Report.
a. The Task Force Report stated that "A position having only
a 5 or 10 percent likelihood of success, if litigated, should
not meet the standard."
b. But a "A position having a likelihood of success closely
approaching one-third should meet the standard." Task
Force Report at 639-40 (emphasis added).
(1) The Task Force Report's one-third percentage was
apparently meant as a safe-harbor, so that positions
with a chance somewhat below one-third might be
sufficient.
(2) However, the one-in-three formulation has been
adopted as a minimum standard in the preparer
regulations. See Reg. §1.6694-2(b)(1).
J. The text of Opinion 85-352 does not explicitly address the lawyer's
ethical duties with respect to tax planning and advice.
1. The Tax Section's proposed revision to Opinion 314 stated that
the same principles that apply to advising a return position
should also apply to tax planning and advice. Proposed Revision
to ABA Opinion 314 at 71.
2. Since advising on tax return positions is inherent in most tax
planning, Opinion 85-352 appears to apply to tax planning by
logical extension. Standards of Tax Practice 214.021
3. The Tax Section Task Force Report agreed with this
understanding, stating that the principles of Opinion 85-352
31
"should apply to all aspects of tax practice to the extent tax
return positions would be involved." Task Force Report at 636.
K. Conclusion: The RPOS standard is commonly accepted, as a more
stringent one than reasonable basis.
1. Nevertheless, a reasonable person comparing the two standards
with no knowledge of their prior history might conclude that their
differences are insignificant.
2. Much of the content of the RPOS standard must be gleaned from
its history, a formidable task for the harried practitioner.
3. Perhaps good faith and common sense provide the ultimate
standard in the everyday world outside the ivory tower: Don't be
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Frivolous 0-5% Patently improper Does not absolve
PROBLEMS
1. Client needs to help Mother financially and has decided to put her on
the payroll of Client's business at $30,000 a year, perhaps as Secretary
and Director. She comes up from Florida several times a year to visit
the family, and Client could arrange to have meetings at that time.
Mother could attend and sign the minutes. Client asks for your
reaction. ABA Section of Taxation, 1992 May Meeting Materials.
2. The following exchange occurs between Lawyer and Client with respect
to a tax return position ("Position A") that Client is considering:
Lawyer: I am quite familiar with the issues presented by
Position A. In my professional judgment, that position is
certainly not frivolous. Therefore, under our tax system, which
permits you to test positions in litigation with the Service before
payment of tax, you have a right to adopt Position A on your tax
return. If your return is audited, the Service will almost
certainly disagree with the position and will thus assert a
deficiency in tax. However, you will be entitled to litigate the
validity of the issue prior to payment in the United States Tax
Court. In my opinion, adoption of Position A presents no issues
of fraud or negligence whether or not that position is expressly
disclosed on the return. However, I must also advise you that
I do not believe that substantial authority within the meaning
of Section 6662 of the Code exists to support Position A. As a
consequence, if the position is adopted on your return but is not
adequately disclosed and if it is ultimately not sustained, you
would likely be held liable for the twenty percent substantial
understatement penalty. You may avoid any risk of incurring
that penalty by making adequate disclosure on the return.
Under the circumstances, if you are determined to adopt
Position A, I advise you to make adequate disclosure.
Client:I would like to understand all aspects of this situation.
[There follows a discussion in which Lawyer and Client discuss
fully the merits of the position and other relevant factors. In
this discussion, Lawyer is fully candid and truthful and operates
with well-informed and thoughtful professional judgment.]
Lawyer: I think that about sums up all of the relevant
considerations. I can't think of anything else that you need to
do to make your decisions. I reiterate my advice that it is in
your best interest to make adequate disclosure if Position A is
adopted.
Client: Thank you very much. I now think that I understand
the situation in full. I have decided to adopt Position A. While
I do appreciate your advice that disclosure would be a prudent
step to avoid risk of the substantial understatement penalty,
and while I accept your judgment that it is in my best interest
to do so, it is also contrary to my personal and business
philosophy to telegraph and signal that a position that I adopt
is thought by me to have a weakness. Disclosure here would
seem to me to do just that, even though I acknowledge your view
that this is not necessarily so. Since you advise me that
Position A, whether or not disclosed, presents no issues of fraud
or negligence, and because you advise me that the law does not
demand my disclosure of Position A, I have decided against
disclosure. Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice: A
Commentary 9 VA. TAX REV. 771, 775 (1990).
3. Lawyer, thoroughly researches a position to be taken on Client's
return. Lawyer finds the following "authorities": (a) a 20-year old
Federal District Court decision in another state which is on all fours
factually and supports the Taxpayer's proposed position, but with very
weak reasoning; (b) an 11-year old Tax Court Memorandum case
written by the current Chief Judge which is not on all fours and
supports the IRS' contrary position in result, but in dictum suggests a
different and highly technical rationale (each step of which is
conceptually sound) as supporting the District Court's result (but not
its reasoning) and, hence, the Taxpayer's proposed position; and (c) a
published 3-year old Revenue Ruling which specifically rejects the Tax
Court memorandum dictum rationale. The Taxpayer takes the position
which results in an understatement of $30,000. There is no "adequate
disclosure" of the Taxpayer's position. Thanks for this problem to
Professor John Lee of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
4. The relevant authorities relating to the treatment of an item on
Taxpayer's return are four Federal Circuit Court cases and a provision
of the Internal Revenue Code. All four cases are factually
indistinguishable from the taxpayer's case. Three of the cases favor
the government's position. The remaining case, favoring Taxpayer's
position, has been decided in the jurisdiction in which T resides.
Standards of Tax Practice 208.0312.
5. Practitioner is engaged to prepare the tax return for Client
Corporation. In reviewing the prior year return (that Practitioner did
not prepare), Practitioner discovers that the ending inventory for the
prior year was understated, with the result that taxable income for
that year was likewise understated. Practitioner discussed the error
with Client, and is satisfied that the error was inadvertent. However,
Client declines to file an amended return to correct the error. Client
observes that it would have to amend not only the Federal return but
also the returns in all states in which it does business and that this
would be a large and expensive burden. Client asks that Practitioner
simply proceed with the current return carrying forward the erroneous
figure. What are the issues? Standards of Tax Practice 223.043.
6. Client engages Practitioner to prepare Client's federal income tax
return. Client owns a limited partnership interest and provides
Practitioner with a Schedule K-1 reflecting Client's share of the
partnership's items of income and loss for the year. The Schedule K-1
mistakenly reflects a partnership loss for the year, due to inclusion of
the full amount of a nonrecourse note in the basis of the partnership's
property without reduction for the amount of unstated interest with
respect to the note. If the information reported on the Schedule K-1
does not reflect the nature of the partnership financing, may
Practitioner rely on the depreciation figures used? Standards of Tax
Practice 223.013.
7. Client engages Lawyer to form a non-tax shelter limited partnership
that is expected to produce tax losses in the early years. After
thorough research, Lawyer concludes that, because the general
partner, a corporation, has insufficient capital, the partnership is likely
to be treated as a corporation for federal tax purposes, and, as a
consequence, that the losses will not be deductible by the "partners."
Lawyer informs Client that the treatment of the venture as a
partnership for federal tax purposes and the deduction of the losses by
the partners does not have a realistic possibility of success if
challenged. Notwithstanding Lawyer's advice, Client, unable to find
a way to come up with additional capital, insists on retaining the
current plan. What should Lawyer do? Standards of Tax Practice
223.022.
8. Assume the same facts as in number 7 above, except that the issue in
controversy involves whether the partnership may deduct fees paid for
"tax advice" in connection with the sale of the limited partnership
interests. Lawyer concludes that the deduction, which is "minor" in
comparison to the partnership's overall return, does not possess a
realistic possibility of success if challenged. Id.
